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Abstract: This chapter discusses several kinds of reduction that are often found in the 
biomedical sciences, in contrast to reduction in fields such as physics. This includes 
reduction as a methodological assumption for how to investigate phenomena like 
complex diseases, and reduction as a conceptual tool for relating distinct models of the 
same phenomenon. The case of Parkinson’s disease illustrates a wide variety of ways in 
which reductionism is an important tool in medicine. 
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1. Introduction 
Reductionism has a long history in philosophical and scientific thought, and is an 
intuitively appealing view about how the world works.  It its simplest form, reduction 
involves taking something larger, more complex, or more specific, and ‘reducing’ it to 
smaller, simpler, or more universal components. Reduction can be understood as a 
relationship between parts of the world, in which case it involves the view that larger 
objects, like physical bodies that we can see and hold, just are lots of very small bodies 
like atoms and molecules, organized by similarly microscopic forces. Reductionism can 
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also be understood as a relationship between theoretical structures like theories, laws, or 
models. In that context, reductionism involves commitment to the goal of taking multiple 
distinct and possibly conflicting models of one phenomenon and reducing those to a 
single, overarching or unifying model of that phenomenon.  
In a medical context, reduction often takes three forms. One is the reduction of a 
system to its component parts and their organization. A second is reduction from a set of 
models to a single model that incorporates or unifies them. A third form of reduction 
involves a simplification in the overall complexity required to explain a particular 
disease, for example, by ‘reducing’ it to a few primary causal factors with a simplified 
causal path along which it unfolds and into which interventions can be attempted to 
alleviate or prevent the disease. Reduction understood as simplification of complexity is 
an especially useful tool in biology, medicine, and related sciences that study target 
systems that are characteristically complex. 
Reduction is a process of moving ‘downward’, to less complexity, smaller sizes, 
and fewer models. It has a converse process, that of integration, which involves moving 
‘upward’, to complex interacting causal structure, to larger size scales or higher levels, 
and to navigation among multiple overlapping models. Like integration and 
differentiation in calculus, these directions in which one can move are not in competition  
– they each have a use and must often be deployed together in the overall process of 
solving a problem (Mitchell 2002). 
Reduction is a useful tool both conceptually and methodologically. 
Methodologically, it is often helpful to think of a disease in terms of a series of smaller, 
less complex, interlocked submechanisms, each of which could potentially be intervened 
on independently. Many diseases stem from dysfunctions at subcellular levels, yet have 
wide-ranging symptom effects at a variety of size scales in the body. Reduction as a 
guiding methodological assumption can assist researchers in isolating the earliest causal 
stages of such diseases, and in isolating the main drivers of a disease in a population 
where there may be a huge variety of causes, but a few causes or causal pathways that are 
common to most cases. Reduction is also methodologically useful for guiding 
interventions: targeting dysfunction earlier in a causal chain of cascading problems is, 
when possible, optimal for preventing or treating disease. Smaller size scales also tend to 
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be (although do note, they are not always) easier to intervene on than are later stages that 
are higher level or more complicated in terms of how far-reaching the effects become. 
Conceptually, reduction can assist us in understanding how different models of 
the same or closely related phenomena relate to one another, so that we can use these 
distinct models under appropriate circumstances. Different methods of studying 
something like protein folding may yield very different models of a target phenomenon 
like a quaternary protein structure. The differences in the models reflect differences in the 
kinds of environments in which each method studies the same proteins, and in the ways 
those environments distort the target to be studied (Mitchell and Gronenborn 
forthcoming). The structure might be studied using X-ray crystallography, ab initio 
predictions based on amino acid sequence, or nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy. 
Even though it is the ‘same’ protein studied each way, each method produces different 
models without being false, since model differences reflect differences in how the 
experimental method and environment affects the protein being studied. Understanding 
how different research methods shape the models those methods can produce of their 
target systems may help us reduce those different models into one overarching or unified 
model of the target phenomenon. Or, reduction may turn out to not be possible, and 
instead of reduction, integration of the models is required, to guide researchers in 
knowing which model(s) to deploy under a variety of circumstances. It can still be 
conceptually fruitful to pursue reduction until we are clear on the details of why reduction 
fails. 
Biomedical sciences are arguably the setting in which we can find the most 
striking gaps between what we can call the locus of explanation and the locus of control. 
The locus of explanation is the mechanism or mechanisms, at their characteristic size 
scale, that are primarily responsible for a given effect. In the case of a mis-folded protein, 
the characteristic mechanisms will involve subcellular machinery, the chemical 
environment, the base pairs in the protein, and more. These are all at a characteristic and 
similar size scale, yet the effects of mis-folding might cascade up the size scale to 
produce symptoms at a variety of physical size levels. The locus at which we identify the 
primary source or origin of a particular causal chain or disease is the locus of explanation 
for it. This might differ, sometimes dramatically, from the loci available for interventions 
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to prevent or alleviate the disease. The locus of intervention is the mechanism or 
mechanisms on which we actually intervene in clinical practice. This is constrained by a 
host of factors beyond the locus of explanation. We might simply not have developed any 
intervention that could target the locus of explanation; it might not be feasible for 
logistical or ethical reasons. Instead, knowledge gained through reduction downwards 
and integration upwards might yield a different target for intervention, a locus for control 
that is not the main causal driver but nevertheless is pragmatically accessible to us.  
The way in which reduction figures in characteristically medical examples will be 
illustrated by considering Parkinson’s disease. This disease is now known to have several 
variants. One variant is monogenic; another involves the interaction of several genes. One 
is environmental, involving exposure to known toxins. And one involves the combination 
of multiple genes that render a patient more susceptible, coupled with subsequent 
exposure to environmental toxins. Originally defined as an idiopathic disease, with no 
known origin, researchers have used reductionist methodological tools and conceptual 
frameworks to isolate the genes and environmental factors that drive this disease, and to 
work towards unification of the various causal etiologies into a common pathway by 
which to identify and distinguish Parkinson’s from other diseases. This yields a variety of 
potential targets for intervention. A locus of control might involve eliminating use of the 
pesticides known to trigger it; another locus might involve targeting pharmaceutical 
interventions that prevent or slow genetically triggered deterioration; or a locus might 
focus on lessening symptoms directly. 
Parkinson’s helps illustrate the power of reduction as a guiding assumption, and 
the ways in which reduction can fail in the face of certain kinds of complexities. 
Ultimately, the success or failure of reduction in the biomedical sciences depends on the 
particular phenomenon in question. Some causal structures yield great insights when 
reduction is applied as a methodological and conceptual tool; some causal structures, 
because of details related to their internal complexity and the difficulty in controlling 
messy complexity in experimental settings, resist reduction indefinitely. 
 
2. Reduction: Sweeping Physics and Creeping Biomedicine 
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Physics is a field where reductionism has a long history of leading to useful 
scientific breakthroughs, and for which most accounts of reduction were originally 
developed. Many, or arguably all, accounts of reductionism that were developed to apply 
in physics foundered when they were applied to other sciences such as biology and 
medicine. The systems being studied in physics versus the biomedical sciences differ in 
so many relevant ways, and the tools available to study them differ so dramatically, that it 
is illuminating to first see what reductionism looks like in fields such as physics, and then 
see how this picture gets complicated in the case of the biomedical sciences.  
The most traditional account of reduction can be seen in Oppenheim and 
Putnam’s classic paper, “The Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis” (1958). They 
present reduction as key to the unification of different areas of science. The world is 
divided up into levels of physical size and organization, each of which is associated with 
a characteristic field of study. Physics is the most fundamental. The next, chemistry, is 
taken to be nothing more than complicated physics that could in principle be eliminated 
with sufficient knowledge of the relevant physics. Biology is above and reduces to 
chemistry, and psychology to biology. This hierarchy embeds strong commitments about 
the ‘real’ objects and the most fundamental fields of study. Molecules just are 
compounded particles; organisms just are complicated arrangements of chemicals, and so 
on. Following on these levels relationships in the world, the theories of chemistry should 
be reducible to the theories of physics, and those of biology to chemistry, etc. 
On this way of thinking, reduction is the path by which to unify the disparate 
sciences together. Oppenheim and Putnam take the unity of science to be, first, an ideal 
future state of science, in which the vocabulary used in one science can be fully translated 
into the vocabulary of another. The concept of a genetic disease, for instance, would be 
entirely translatable into chemical terminology, and then into the terminology of particle 
physics. Oppenheim and Putnam take the unity of science to be, second, a trend in 
science, such that unification of apparently disparate phenomena is an ongoing process, 
and we can continue to unify even if we never reach the ideal end state of total unity. In 
that regard, reduction as traditionally conceived is somewhat closer to what can be found 
in medicine in terms of unification of distinct models at distinct levels into a more 
	   6	  
comprehensive view of the whole, but without the end goal of a single, molecule by 
molecule and moment by moment map of everything in the body.  
There are some systems studied by physics that undermine such strong reduction. 
For instance, in phase transitions for gasses, there are behaviors that are almost 
completely independent of the microphysical details of the system in question. That 
would mean that reduction of such systems would yield less rather than more explanation 
of the target phenomenon (Batterman 2000). Nevertheless, there is a strong tendency 
towards successful breakthroughs following the method of reducing complex systems to 
smaller and simpler parts that are studied separately and then re-assembled, and a track 
record of making new discoveries by connecting via attempted but failed reduction the 
theories for higher-level behaviors such as boxes of gas to theories for lower-level 
behaviors such as energy and momentum of atoms. 
Such reductions in physics are examples of what Schaffner (2006, 2011) has 
called “sweeping reductions.” They take a broad swath of phenomena and demonstrate 
how they are completely explainable with reference to their smaller scale components, or 
as specific instances of a more universal phenomenon. Sweeping reductionism is strong: 
it commits to the idea that, ontologically, there is nothing at the higher levels in a 
metaphysically strong sense. That which is reduced is thereby ontologically dependent on 
or secondary to that by which it is reduced.  
Schaffner contrasts this with “creeping reductions,” which are small reductions 
between specific phenomena at different levels, such that the higher level is not 
eliminated but rather connected in an explanatory way to the lower level. Creeping 
reductions lack the synoptic scope and grand unificatory power of sweeping reductions. 
These are much less dramatic, as least from a philosopher’s perspective, than a sweeping 
reduction. As rare as sweeping reductions are in physics, they are completely absent from 
fields like medicine, where creeping reductions are considered successes.  
Creeping reductions are not thereby less valuable or easy to achieve in biology 
and related sciences. Schaffner notes that creeping reductions “…are fragmentary patchy 
explanations, and though patchy and fragmentary, they are very important, potentially 
Nobel-prize winning advances” (2011, 139). The systems studied in physics lend 
themselves to decomposition as a technique for study. The systems in biology and 
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medicine, on the other hand, cannot be so simply decomposed while still retaining the 
features that make them of interest to us. Reducing a sample organism to component 
atomic elements might be possible, certainly, but sorting an organism into piles of atomic 
elements is not a way to figure out what the organism is like when it is intact, what it can 
do in various environments, and how to intervene on it in medically illuminating ways. 
Creeping reductions accomplish important explanatory work that lack the universal 
character of sweeping reductions but which nevertheless yield incredibly useful 
information when they are found. 
Levels and mechanisms are a useful way of understanding the compositional and 
organizational structure of systems, especially in biology, medicine, and related fields. 
There are many, many ways to individuate levels in organisms, including humans, but 
there are some that tend to be robust across populations and across species. Cells are 
often a useful level on which to focus. Picking out the cell level can be thought of as 
analogous to focusing a mental microscope at that magnification, or zooming in to a map 
to the street level but not the house by house or city by city level. Certain kinds of 
physical processes, recognizable types of entities (including non-cellular ones), 
identifiable patterns of activity, and common temporal scales, can be characterized at the 
cellular level. Moving ‘downward’, or zooming in on the map, subcellular machinery 
pops into focus, with a somewhat different set of characteristic processes, on a slightly 
different time scale, that together constitute the cell at the next level up. Further down we 
find the genetic level with complex molecular biology, where macromolecules with 
potentially incredibly complex physical organizations and time scales play key roles. 
These, taken together in their totality of interactions, constitute the subcellular machinery 
of another level up.  
Going in the other direction from cells, tissues are a frequently used individuation 
of levels in the human body. Tissues involve cells as components, but not in the 
simplistic way that a house made of blocks involves those blocks as small pieces. To 
count as a tissue, there have to be special kinds of interactions between the cells, and 
similarities in terms of their type, or common function, or some other parameter. There 
are many important mechanisms, and many medical issues, that can be best described in 
terms of tissues. Further up, organs are another common level at which to find a 
	   8	  
distinctive set of processes, entities, activities, and time scales. Systems, such as the 
endocrine system or the nervous system, are arguably the highest sub-organism level. 
Zooming yet further out, though, the human body can also be understood as one 
distinctive entity, engaging in certain kinds of processes and activities at characteristic 
time scales. The social environment of a person may be invoked to explain certain kinds 
of anxiety or stress reactions, and it might be at the larger social or physical environment 
levels to which more effective interventions might be targeted. 
Mechanisms offer another way to keep track of reduction between levels. 
Mechanisms are causal chains of entities and activities that are connected in such a way 
that, once triggered, they proceed reliably enough through the causal pathway to a 
termination state, which may involve a cycle that is maintained (where the termination 
state is the triggering conditions again for the same mechanism) (Andersen 2014 a and b). 
Mechanisms involve some degree of regularity, in that the same causal pathways retain 
their stability so that they perform similarly over time and in different instances. 
(Andersen 2012a). For instance, the transcription of DNA by RNA to form various 
proteins involves mechanisms that work consistently, and about which we can make 
stable generalizations that might not satisfy a strong reductionist but which do provide 
weakly reductive characterizations of the relevant upper level phenomena. Mechanisms 
in medicine are often ones that involve hidden causal relationships, however, to maintain 
certain kinds of stable parameters in the body (Andersen 2012b). This makes mechanisms 
a difficult way to construe reduction in medicine, by providing less experimental 
guidance for effective intervention even when reduction is in principle possible. 
As this discussion illustrates, there are some robust ways to individuate levels in 
the human body. However, there need not be any ‘one right set’ of levels by which to 
break down such a complex system. Some mechanisms might cross levels, some 
phenomena might involves cascades upwards from the molecular level to effects that are 
macroscopic and phenotypical in size scale. Some phenomena, such as the folding of 
complex protein structures, might sit awkwardly between the molecular and subcellular 
levels, and a different way of individuating levels would be required when researching 
those phenomena. There is no single level individuation built into the world itself; such 
divisions always involve an element of pragmatic interest and attention on our part as 
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researchers, clinicians, and patients. Levels should instead be thought of as handy 
divisions in order to keep track of where the action is, so to speak. 
Reduction in the biomedical sciences is thus unique compared to sciences like 
physics in terms of the complexity of systems to which reduction is applied, the extent to 
which it is illuminating to reduce systems to component parts, and the extent of the 
resulting unification from successful reductions – sweeping in physics, creeping in 
biomedicine. 
 
3. Reduction as a methodological approach in biomedicine 
There are many ways in which reduction can manifest in the collection of 
sciences that are grouped under the heading biomedicine. These sciences share a focus on 
the human body, at all relevant levels from the subcellular through to the 
social/environmental, from earliest development through old age. Informally, this goal of 
understanding is oriented towards explanation, in terms of explaining how things work 
when they work well and what goes wrong when things go wrong; and towards 
intervention, in terms of finding ways to keep things working normally and to restore as 
much normal function as possible when they are not. 
Linus Pauling used the notion of a “molecular disease” to show how mutation 
involved in the gene for one protein was sufficient to explain sickle cell anemia. This 
involved a conceptual orientation, namely, commitment to the idea that there was a single 
or very few primary causal drivers of the disease to which other complexities in the 
manifestation of the symptoms could be reduced. It also involved a methodological 
orientation, namely, commitment to such a causal driver being at the molecular level, 
rather than at a higher level of organization. “Thus, a single molecular change is 
fundamental to understanding the patient’s pathology, symptoms, and prognosis” (Kandel 
et al 2000, 867). This encapsulates the potential for reduction in the biomedical sciences 
– when it works, it works well. 
Being able to successfully take a disease as complex as sickle cell anemia or 
Parkinson’s and reduce it to a single genetic error that cascades through various systems, 
even if that reduction holds for only a proper subset of cases, illustrates that reduction can 
be a powerful tool for research and explanation in medicine. It cannot be the only tool in 
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the toolkit, since there will be diseases or dysfunctions that may be only partially 
reducible, or for which only some cases are reducible. But it is a good working 
assumption, as Oppenheim and Putnam put it, in tackling a problem with an unknown 
etiology, to look for ways to reduce it to a few or even a single causal driver at a 
molecular level. 
Consider the case of Parkinson’s disease. Parkinson’s is a disorder affecting the 
nervous system, resulting in characteristic tremors and slowed and difficult movements. 
In the monogenic variant, a single allele results in a mis-folded version of a key protein in 
the brain, alpha-synuclein. The triggering condition is the genetic component, which 
leads to a mis-shaped protein that then clumps in characteristic ways to form Lewy 
bodies that accumulate, especially in the substantia nigra. This part of the mid-brain in 
involved in, for instance, controlling movements, and the accumulation of Lewy bodies 
inside of the nerve cells in this area lead to the characteristic tremors and other issues 
with motor control seen at the human level in Parkinson’s patients. 
The mechanisms by which Parkinson’s affects those with the disease involve 
small molecular changes that cascade up through different level boundaries, per Pauling’s 
description. This holds even though distinct factors such as single genes, gene 
combinations, and environmental factors can be involved in the onset of Parkinson’s. In 
monogenic cases, though, Parkinson’s disease is like sickle cell anemia, in that it is the 
result of a very localized genetic mutation.  
Thus, considering the monogenic case, there are several senses of reduction by 
which a complex, multi-level phenomenon like Parkinson’s might be reduced. The 
mechanisms involved may be at a lower level of organization than that of downstream 
causal effects. The locus of causal explanation of the dysfunction might be at a very small 
size scale, such a subcellular level, rather than at a higher level such as organs. And there 
may be a great deal of complexity and noise in the patient population, such that it is very 
difficult to discern for many patients what caused the onset of the disease, that can be 
reduced away by identifying a clear genetic component for some variants. There is thus 
no single way but rather a nexus of ways in which research has reduced Parkinson’s: 
causal complexity must be reduced to a few initial transcription errors; mechanisms for 
control of movement at the mid-brain level are reduced to mechanisms at the subcellular 
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level; and physical size scale is reduced further along the chain, from organism-level 
symptoms to mid-brain structures like the substantia nigra to protein aggregates inside 
nerve cells to allele-sized triggering conditions. Nevertheless, this nexus of ways all point 
‘downward’ in a reductive fashion, such that the locus of explanation for Parkinson’s is 
illuminated by reduction, and options for targeting interventions appear because of the 
reduction. 
There are several examples here of a creeping reduction in Schaffner’s sense, a 
patchy and fragmentary connection between partial explanations. This is highlighted by 
the fact that this explanation as given only applies to the rare monogenic case; additional 
factors must be introduced for multi-genic cases, and yet more for the environmental 
cases. Nevertheless, a key insight into Parkinson’s came out of the methodological 
constraints imposed by the reductive assumption that it might be a molecular disease, in 
Pauling’s term, by which possible avenues for intervention were revealed. 
 
4. A conceptual guide to navigating a plurality of models 
In its traditional understanding from physics, reduction ultimately involves 
relationships between theories, laws, models, or other representational content being 
reduced via translation into the terminology of another theory. By extension to medicine, 
if Parkinson’s involves genetic causes, then on this understanding of reduction as a 
relationship between theoretical structures like models, we should be able to assemble a 
single overarching or unified model from the concatenated models of various stages of 
the diseases, of the distorted protein shape through to how this protein clumps into Lewy 
bodies, through how these accumulate in the substantia nigra cells, through to the 
disruption on motor control that is a consequence. This is something of an ideal, like the 
perfectly unified science that Oppenheim and Putnam envisioned, that we may never 
reach, but towards which researchers do often aim. 
There are reasons to think we may never be able to reach such a unification of all 
the different stages of such a complex mechanism as that involved in the cascading 
effects of the monogenic variant of Parkinson’s. Mitchell and Gronenborn (2015) show 
how different techniques for modeling the quaternary structure of a protein result in 
differences in the modeled shape. These different shapes can be incorporated into a 
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fusion model that uses them to triangulate somewhat on the actual shape of the protein. 
But a reduction in this case would involve being able to eliminate the prior models, either 
because they are redundant given the new one, or because one is found to be more 
accurate than the other. In the case of protein folding, it would be a mistake to say that 
one model is more accurate than another: they are different, because they are generated 
using different techniques that place the protein in different environments and 
systematically deform it in different ways. These techniques for modeling the same 
quaternary protein structure have, in an important sense, different objects that they 
model. 
Such protein modeling techniques are involved in studying the protein structures 
that go awry in genetic variants of Parkinson’s (both monogenic and those involving 
multiple genes). Yet in the simplest case, we should not expect a reduction in models in 
the sense of ending up with fewer of them, but rather an integration of models that must 
be retained in a pluralistic way. Even the simplest monogenic case appears to resist 
model-reduction to a single overarching and exhaustive representation of the mechanisms 
by which symptoms are produced. Instead of aiming for an idealized but probably 
unreachable unification via reduction of the models, we can look for ways to integrate 
without reducing. This means finding techniques for navigating the pluralism of models 
with knowledge about how each model was produced that can inform when we should 
rely on model or another model based on our pragmatic interests in using it. 
Parkinson’s disease has yet more complexity in this regard as well, because there 
are variants that involve environmental components. There are other ways to construe 
how Parkinson’s can involve a reduction in causal complexity that does not require 
idealized model simplification. There are distinct causal mechanisms that lead to four 
variants of Parkinson’s: the monogenic variant, as we saw; a multi-gene variant; an 
environmentally caused variant; and a variant involving both genetic susceptibility and 
environmental causes. Thus, in the general population of patients with Parkinson’s, there 
are multiple causal etiologies for patients with Parkinson’s, at different size scales. 
Furthermore, some patients may individually have a variety of causal factors involved in 
their case of Parkinson’s, such as the interaction between several gene sites that 
contribute to susceptibility, and environmental factors that trigger Parkinson’s in the 
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presence of that genetic susceptibility. Modeling the variants of Parkinson’s will thus 
require the integration of multiple models that may each involve multiple levels of 
organization. For the variant involving both environmental exposure combined with 
genetic susceptibility, these models cannot be reduced in the sense of being combined 
into one overarching model. Rather, they must be integrated so that researchers can 
navigate the complex causal pathways at each characteristic level of organization and 
those that cascade up or down levels as well. 
Even in the case of Parkinson’s with multiple sites for genetic susceptibility in 
combination with environmental exposure, though, there can be other goals served by 
intertheoretic or inter-model reduction. For a single patient with a causally complex 
etiology for Parkinson’s, reduction can highlight a few key causal drivers, and leave out 
those that are not the primary causal factors. Even though some of the key causal factors 
are not available as loci for control (the exposure to chemicals has already occurred for a 
given individual, for instance), reducing the number of causal factors under consideration 
in the models to just a few key drivers still may be illuminating as loci of explanation. 
Parkinson’s disease is an excellent example of a complex disease where several different 
kinds of reductions have yielded insight into variation across patient populations and in 
variation across the etiological factors for individual patients. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Reduction is a powerful tool for investigating phenomena in the biomedical 
sciences. It can guide methodological inquiry in useful ways, and provide conceptual 
frameworks that bring clarity to complexity and enable researchers, clinicians, and others 
to navigate among relevant models and to test and implement various intervention 
strategies. Reduction can involve ‘zooming in’, to smaller size scales or levels of 
organization. It can involve the reduction of many models to one inclusive model for a 
phenomenon. And, it can involve a reduction in the degree of complexity required to 
explain or control. Cases like Parkinson’s show how many different kinds of reduction 
applied to the same phenomenon can nevertheless robustly point in the same direction. 
Reduction cannot serve alone as such a tool, however, in the biomedical sciences. 
In physics, the integration of components back into a cohesive system is vastly simpler 
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than it is in biological systems. Here, reduction needs to be paired with integration as a 
strategy to focus in on the right level: one zooms in and the other zooms out, and with 
both tools the right level at which to describe and explain, as well as to control and 
intervene, can be found. Reduction can also yield explanations that are not themselves 
suitable as direct targets for interventions. But finding the locus on explanation via 
reduction opens up downstream pathways that might serve as useful loci of control for 
preventing or alleviating symptoms.  
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Oppenheim, P., & Putnam, H. (1958). Unity of science as a working hypothesis. In 
Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven & Grover Maxwell (eds.). University of 
Minnesota Press (3), 3-36. (A classic text for discussions of reduction) 
Waters, Ken, "Molecular Genetics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 
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